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Three Approaches to Psychical Reality: An Interview with Dr. 
Antoine Mooij 
During the fall of 2012, my first semester in the newly developed doctoral program 
Psychology: Consciousness and Society at University of West Georgia, I happened upon 
a remarkable book that was to become a continuing source of inspiration and guidance 
for my studies in psychology pursued as a human science – Antoine Mooij’s Psychiatry 
as a Human Science: Phenomenological, Hermeneutical and Lacanian Perspectives.  
Human science psychology emphasizes the centrality and irreducibility of psychical 
reality, of first person subjective experience, even as it recognizes its overdetermined 
character in the multiple causal networks of evolving nature and culture. As I was 
becoming acquainted with the diverse methodological approaches to accessing this 
psychical reality in my coursework, I was very often left with the impression that these 
approaches were characterized by irreconcilable differences in both philosophical 
commitments and rhetorical styles, and that an integrative approach combining the best 
of the human science traditions was neither possible nor desirable. Antoine Mooij’s 
Psychiatry as a Human Science demonstrated to me without a doubt that an integrative 
approach involving three of the most historically important human science traditions – 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, and Lacanian psychoanalysis – was not only possible, but 
indeed unexpectedly illuminating, as each approach built upon and presupposed the 
others in an almost dialectical fashion. Experience, meaning, and reflexively accounting 
for the formal effects of language on what Lacan would eventually call parlêtre, or 
speaking-being, constitute three moments of an atemporal unity, each of them distinct, 
but none of which can be thought without the others. I contacted Dr. Mooij in the fall of 
‘14 proposing the idea of an interview by email.  He very kindly accepted this offer, and I 
posed to him some of the questions that had been foremost in my mind while reading his 
work. Perhaps my greatest curiosity of all was why a psychiatrist would be interested in 
psychical reality in the first place, given modern psychiatry’s increasing disregard of the 
subjective dimension in favor of objective neurophysiological explanations and 
interventions. This interest indeed had to do with Dr. Mooij’s own life history, 
professional training and background, something of which he graciously shares in our 
following correspondence. 
 
 
Chris Bell (CB): Two of your books have recently been published in English, 
Intentionality, Desire, Responsibility by Brill and Psychiatry as a Human Science: 
Phenomenological, Hermeneutical and Lacanian Perspectives by Rodopi. Both of these 
studies are notable for emphasizing a human sciences approach to the psychological 
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subject, or the experiencing person, in the fields of Law and Psychiatry. Such an 
approach may be considered non-obvious in an era that prizes the utility of natural 
science. Why is a human science approach important for these fields today? 
 
Antoine Mooij (AM): Before answering the questions I would first like to speak about 
myself. I studied medicine and philosophy, but during that time I already wanted to be a 
psychiatrist. The education in philosophy (rather classical) has helped me tremendously 
in psychiatry. I trained as a psychoanalyst, wrote a thesis about Lacan, which introduced 
Lacan in the Netherlands. The book (Taal en Verlangen, Language and Desire, 1975) has 
been the first introduction to Lacan’s philosophy for a long time, both in the Netherlands 
and in Belgium. Back then I also met Lacan, and spoke with many Lacanians. However, I 
have always avoided Lacanian institutions. In the Netherlands some tact is necessary 
when speaking about Lacan; in general people are rejective (it is different in Belgium). I 
have also done a lot of work in the fields of phenomenology and hermeneutics; in the 
Netherlands these are traditionally incorporated in philosophy, but also in early 
psychiatry (Rümke). I have been working as a psychoanalyst, psychotherapist, and in 
addition to that I was director of a forensic psychiatric clinic, the observation clinic of the 
Ministry of Justice, which focuses on the determination of criminal responsibility (Pieter 
Baan Center). I was there to supervise the diagnoses, which then fed my interest in 
personality disorders. I've gained a lot of experience. I also taught psychopathology to 
law students and philosophical anthropology to students in philosophy (respectively as a 
professor and an honorary professor). Summing it up: there are a lot of connections in my 
work, because I find that opposites are often magnified in academic discussions. The 
contradictions are there, but they are not always as great as they are made out to be. 
 
CB: Can you share a bit about your own history and intellectual trajectory?  How is it 
that a medically trained Psychiatrist could become a defender of a decidedly non-medical 
approach to psychological subjectivity? 
 
AM: Secondly: But doing all that I do choose for psychic reality. The biological aspect is 
also important for psychopathology, but in my opinion that importance is being 
overrated. Speaking in computer terms, I think the problem is often not to be found in the 
hardware, but in the input (as a result of which the hardware is disrupted, this is why 
psychopharmacology can be very useful). Certainly, I consider psychopharmacology an 
important asset. The way it is used nowadays is a different question. Anyway, the 
psychopathology of today is in imbalance. Moreover, the unilateral orientation on 
biology has not brought much gain for the practice (especially regarding medication). But 
it seems a little more balance is growing. It is moving towards both nature and nurture. 
 
CB: In Psychiatry As a Human Science you provide a unique account of space and time 
orientations of clinical subject positions in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Can you speak to 
how you arrived at this compelling analysis?  
 
AM: Thirdly: within the realm of psychic reality I am choosing for an integrative 
approach, not as a primary goal, but as a result of the determination of one-sidedness and 
parallels. A deficient me, moi, (schizophrenia) in Lacan’s thinking, does not differ much 
from an ipseity-disorder (Sass) or a deficiency of the anti-predicative atmosphere 
(Blankenberg). Through the anthropological psychiatry I have encountered the 
importance of time, and through Binswanger the importance of time and space. I tried to 
insert that into the Lacanian scheme (which I have also varied and which in my opinion 
corresponds a lot with the classical nosology). To my surprise, this turned out to fit quite 
well. Certainly regarding phobia, which is largely a space problem: not daring to take up 
space (this is reflected also in the German word Angst, angustia, narrow space). And 
although some anticipatory anxiety is always present, time is mainly the near future and 
the danger threatening there, right now, coming from the outside (hence the panic). This 
is different from compulsions. Here the danger comes primarily from within (primarily 
one checks him/herself) followed by an overall control of the area (through the height 
dimension, and living in anticipation). As a side note, I am thinking of the compulsive 
personality (OCPD), not so much of the pure OC disorders. At any rate, I consider this 
psychopathological scheme as a supplement to the classifying diagnostics: finding out 
where the problem of the person concerned lies, for the purpose of a structural diagnosis. 
 
CB: In what ways has your work as a forensic psychiatrist influenced your theoretical 
perspective on psychopathology?  Did your interest in forensic psychiatry predate your 
interest in psychoanalysis, or rather did your interest in psychoanalysis lead you to work 
as a forensic psychiatrist?  What research areas or questions do you see as remaining 
outstanding or requiring further elucidation for the field of forensic psychiatry? 
 
AM: In forensic psychiatry the question of responsibility, criminal responsibility, is 
central. Obviously, in different legal systems (and states) this is interpreted differently; in 
the Anglo-Saxon world it often takes the form of the insanity defense. Specifically, this is 
often a cognitive interpretation of the McNaghten-rule: a defect of reason, in the sense of 
not knowing the nature and quality of the act one is doing. This rule can be applied well 
to psychotic disorders, in which cases the insanity defense is sometimes accepted. In 
these cases the DSM-IV/V system can be used. There must be a causal link between the 
disorder, a mental state, and the offense (see the McNaghten-rule). However: in Europe 
and in the UK, the category of diminished responsibility is also applied (diminished 
responsibility). This is also used in some states of the US (to determine the criminal 
sentence). Often personality disorders are the issue. In these cases the transition from the 
DSM-IV/V cannot be made directly, as personality disorders do not describe a mental 
state at a precise moment; instead they describe a habit, a disposition. If anyone wants to 
decide on diminished responsibility, they would have to form an opinion on the mental 
state of the moment, to make a situational analysis, and to make a structural analysis of 
the person. The DSM-IV/V axis II does not offer a structural outline, therefore a DSM 
diagnosis must always be complemented by structural consideration (and a life history). 
In other words, forensic psychiatry has shown me the special importance of structural 
psychopathology (such as Lacan’s). Psychoanalysis has thus strongly influenced my 
vision of forensic psychiatry. (NOTE: The therapeutic efforts are independent from the 
forensic evaluation: these could involve medication, behavioral therapy, and possibly 
psychodynamic psychotherapy.) My interest in psychoanalysis thus preceded that in 
forensic psychiatry. It came first. But forensic psychiatry has offered me the opportunity 
to bring hermeneutical psychiatry into practice. That is why forensic psychiatry appealed 
to me: it offered the possibility of providing a very nuanced diagnosis that does not get 
stuck on the DSM level. It is difficult to say what the future will bring in terms of 
research. Definitely it is important to indicate the constraints of the predictive value of 
the current risk-evaluations (HCR etc). They may be valuable at a group level, but not 
necessarily at the individual level. Conceptual work is still needed: including that related 
to criminal responsibility. 
 
CB: You mentioned that through your work in forensic psychiatry, you developed a 
particular interest in personality disorders, which constitute types of subjectivity that, 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, are neither classically neurotic nor psychotic. It would 
seem that psychoanalysis has had more difficulty with establishing the coordinates of this 
type of subjectivity than psychiatry, which addresses the condition on the basis of a 
spectrum or continuum. What do you feel has aided your work, either theoretically or 
practically, in conceptualizing this category?  
 
AM: I always have had an interest in personality disorders (see above). It is true that 
psychoanalysis offers little in this regard (exceptions: Kohut, Kernberg). Lacan offers 
nothing at all. In my book I am especially trying to conceptualize personality disorders 
from a Lacanian perspective (Lacan did not do this, and the Lacanians often do not 
either). I do so by limiting them to three, with perversion (now seen as a personality 
disorder) as the core, and the variations, the modulations thereof, in the borderline and 
narcissistic positions. Splitting, or disavowal, is the central concept. 
 
CB: On a more pragmatic level, how would you describe the daily routine of your work 
as a forensic psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and academic?  When do you do your work?  
Where do you do it? 
 
AM:   do not work anymore, I am retired. I worked half-time as director of the forensic 
psychiatric clinic of the Ministry of Justice (responsible for reporting), half-time as a 
psychoanalyst and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, and was a professor for one day per 
week. The last ten years I have no longer worked as a psychoanalyst, but only as a 
psychoanalytic therapist, and I was a professor for two days a week. 
 
CB: What have been some influential books for you?  
 
AM: Books, that's a tough question. Influential: Lacan, Ecrits; Thomas Mann. 
 
CB: You mentioned that you are writing a book comparing the neo-Kantian philosopher 
Ernest Cassirer with Lacan. Can you speak about why you were inspired to carry out this 
project?  What do you see as the similarities between Cassirer and Lacan’s thought?  
What do you think each author may be able to add to the other’s perspective?  
 
AM: Cassirer and Lacan have completely different backgrounds (Kant, Freud), but 
Cassirer shows that Kant's thought anticipates a theory of symbolization and Lacan 
shows that Freud's thinking leads to a theory of symbolization. First agreement: 
symbolization is not duplication. We represent being, the real, but in such a way that it 
creates a world. Being itself, the real, which Lacan also calls the "Jouissance” is closed 
shut. Casssirer says exactly that. Second agreement: symbolizations form a system, 
systems (like: language, justice). Cassirer speaks of symbolic forms (language, myths, 
justice). Lacan combines these symbolic forms to what he calls: symbolic order. 
However, there are three major differences. First point of difference. With Lacan this 
symbolic order comes from the outside, and forces its terminology, images, ways of 
interpretation and regime onto the subject from the outside. At first that subject is thereby 
alienated by the qualifications forced onto him from the outside (je est un autre). Only 
secondarily the subject may be able to relate to it: am I what they say I am or should be; 
but what do I want myself?  This conflict is not presented by Cassirer. Second point of 
difference. Cassirer works from the concept of meaning (signification), so everything 
eventually can be summarized in a certain sense. Lacan works from the concept of the 
signifier, which makes just such a synthesis impossible. Third point of difference. Lacan, 
especially the late Lacan, tends to substantialize (the Real). Here Cassirer is able to 
correct Lacan. What is the point of this?  The comparison may help to better understand 
Lacan, bring him closer, but can also help to correct a certain one-sidedness of Lacan 
(especially of the late Lacan). It is useful to place Lacan in a broad context, from which 
he himself has been drawing. Then it shows that Lacan does not offer a closed system, 
but is open to, and may be connected with other traditions (as I have tried to show in 
Psychiatry as a Human Science). Also he can be connected to DSM IV/V, deepening it: 
structural diagnostics as an addition to a classifying diagnostics. 
 
CB: Do you feel that the emergence of social media and the increasing technological 
mediation of communication have lead to distinct types of psychopathology, or simply 
exacerbated previously known types of psychopathology? 
 
AM: I believe that the development of social media gives rise to a worsening and 
increase in certain disorders (in the spectrum of the personality disorders), but not to new 
types of disorders (as has been suggested). The importance of the image and the virtual 
accessibility of everything and everyone, the decline of authority, do have consequences 
for the nature of modern subjectivity. That leads to a greater prevalence of narcissistic 
and borderline issues. The system does not specifically change. A structural approach 
constitutes an internal system that transcends time. A different time leads to a different 
prevalence, but not to a different system. 
 
CB: What do you see as the future outlook for talk therapies in general and 
psychoanalysis in particular?  Relatedly, what are your thoughts on psychotherapies such 
as the Open Dialogue form of psychotherapy originating from Finland, that attempts to 
eschew a dyadic clinical encounter in favor of a more guided group-oriented / social 
approach to crisis intervention and psychological well-being?  What do you see as the 
benefits and drawbacks to this approach? 
 
AM: I'm basically open to all forms of psychotherapy (certainly CBT). Psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis definitely have a limited scope (requires being open to 
the inner life, some reflection). The importance of a psychoanalytic perspective is always 
and first of all a careful examination: what is the relationship with the parents, guardians, 
what are the forces someone grew up in, what is his place in the whole, how does he 
place himself in life now (position of the subject)?  For that kind of research, that type of 
treatment, a dynamic approach would be better I think. But I do not want to be dogmatic. 
 
CB: What advice do you have for people interested in psychoanalysis?  What would you 
say to skeptics?  
 
AM: Psychoanalysis is much less strange and connects more with our own lives than we 
think. Culture is still permeated with a psychoanalytic sensibility (although nobody 
recognizes this as psychoanalytic anymore): the importance of psychological reality, of 
the relationship with significant others. It is a fact that nowadays in psychiatry and 
psychology this thought is not very strong (because they so badly want to be biological). 
But humankind is not only a biological being, but also a social being. And the core of the 
psychoanalytic vision is: how this biological, vital aspect compares to the social, cultural 
dimension (parents, siblings, society: the Other).  
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